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1 Introduction 
Empirical studies of behavior in the context of public good provision show that people tend to 
cooperate more than standard economic theory would predict. For instance, in the first round of a 
finitely repeated public good game, players typically contribute between 40 and 60 percent of 
their endowment to the public pool. The fact that in the aggregate this behavior differs 
significantly from both the social optimum and antisocial Nash equilibrium has led to refreshed 
interest in determining what factors affect social cooperation. Several institutional solutions have 
been proposed to curb suboptimal behavior and to prevent the decay toward the Nash 
equilibrium, including Fehr and Gachter’s (2000) innovation of a two-stage game that allows for 
punishment. Since then there have been a number of experiments that demonstrate how the 
problem of under-provision of a public good may be remedied through mutual monitoring and 
the use of decentralized sanctioning when antisocial behavior is observed. This paper aims to 
unite these recent developments in public good literature with insights from charity experiments, 
investigating the effect of publicity and anonymity on both contribution and punishment 
behavior. The simple 2 x 3 experimental design was implemented to build upon work by Bohnet 
and Frey (1998), Anderson and Putterman (2004), Adreoni and Petrie (2004), Rege and Telle 
(2004), Nikiforakis (2004), Masclet et al. (2005), Alpizar et al. (2008), and others. 
In general, our regression results suggest that contribution and punishment decisions change 
under various treatments, and specifically that the public disclosure of players’ actions typically 
increases pro-social behavior. While more research is necessary to confirm the robustness of 
these results using a larger, random sample, this preliminary evidence provides rough coefficient 
estimates on institutional variables and some direction for future studies. The next section of this 
paper supplies a more comprehensive review of recent and relevant literature, from which the 
third section develops a testable theoretical model. The fourth section discusses methodological 
considerations for the experiment. The fifth section contains the results of several fixed-effects 
panel regressions run using lagged values of both the dependent and independent variables. This 
regression analysis is supplemented by a discussion of changes in behavior at different levels of 
aggregation, using two-sample T-tests to demonstrate the potential link between demographic 
characteristics and social cooperation. There is a brief conclusion, with suggestions for future 
empirical research into the factors that may affect social capital and social cooperation. 
 
2 Literature Review 
Early empirical studies of public good behavior were characterized by mild deception and a lack 
of experimental control. Bohm (1972), for instance, set up a small experiment to measure 
subjects’ willingness-to-pay for Swedish public television. Participants were told that 100 other 
players were simultaneously being interviewed in separate rooms when this was not the case. 
Furthermore, the instructions given to each participant are controversial in their explicit use of 
“Counter-strategic” arguments, since the subjects may have been influenced to do what they 
believe the experimenter wanted. Likewise, Marwell et al. (1977) exaggerated the size of the 
study group during a phone survey of cooperative behavior in high-schoolers. Faced with the 
shortcomings of early experiments, Dawes et al. (1977) designed a new laboratory method of 
measuring free-riding behavior in a voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) game. Their 
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payoff matrix created an incentive for participants to choose card X (the private good), but only 
when they expected that everyone else would choose card Y (the public good). For an overview 
of other early public goods experiments, see Ledyard (1995) in Roth and Kagel. 
Ultimately, these early studies showed that a variable of interest in a public goods environment is 
the relative payoff between public contributions and private ones. By controlling the marginal 
per capita return (MPCR), which is the private return on one dollar when it is contributed to the 
public good, more recent empirical research has been able to simplify the experimental 
procedure to reduce confusion. Improving upon the VCM technique developed by Dawes et al. 
(1977), recent research has varied the payoff matrix to allow for both linear and nonlinear 
relationships between private and public contributions (i.e. a nonconstant MPCR). Likewise, 
experimenters have grown more interested in revealing hidden behavior through interactive 
experimental techniques rather than interviews or questionnaires.  
This experimental process also allows for increased institutional variation. For instance, in Fehr 
and Gachter’s (2000) seminal paper, participants played a two-stage game in which they first 
decided how much of a given endowment to contribute to the group pool and then issued costly 
sanctions to reduce the earnings of selected individuals. They showed that the punishment 
institution has a significant effect on reducing the decay toward the Nash equilibrium during 
finitely repeated rounds. However, while punishments are generally directed toward free riders, 
some experimental evidence suggests that spite may be a powerful motivator as well. For 
instance, Cinyabuguma et al. (2004) and Masclet et al. (2005) use VCM games with multiple 
stages of punishment to demonstrate the existence of perverse, second-order punishment (or 
counterpunishment), in which free riders that receive punishment punish those who punished 
them. It seems likely that this second-order punishment may arise either strategically or 
emotionally and that the welfare losses from allowing counterpunishment may offset the welfare 
gains from allowing punishment. 
As several recent studies of charity behavior have shown (List et al. (2004), Adreoni (2006), 
Vesterlund (2006), Alpizar et al. (2008)), publicizing contribution levels may have an effect 
similar to allowing punishments. Both function as a form of the decentralized monitoring 
mechanism where players that act in an antisocial manner risk retribution, either through 
monetary sanctions or through what is perceived as a costly loss of reputation. Alpizar et al. 
(2008) performed an experiment in a natural park in Costa Rica to test this theoretical model of 
reputation, training several park employees to solicit donations of either a private or public 
amount during interviews with park attendees. They found that telling participants that their level 
of contribution would be revealed to the interviewer increased the proportion that contributed but 
lowered the average conditional contribution (i.e. the average amount contributed given that the 
contribution was nonzero). This result reinforces their theoretical models of reputation, 
suggesting that those at the margin may pay a small fee to prevent appearing antisocial. They 
also examine the effect of other social pressures, such as conformity (by announcing a 
recommended donation) and reciprocity (by giving a small gift), in the context of charitable 
decision-making. 
To date there have been only limited attempts to unite the insights from these two discrete 
branches of academic inquiry. Charity experiments have primarily been interested in 
investigating factors that affect individual giving, identifying conformity, reciprocity, and 
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anonymity as relevant factors in the determination of individual reputation. Likewise, public 
goods experiments have largely been interested in isolating or debunking institutional 
characteristics that affect cooperative behavior in a group-based context. By acknowledging that 
group-based decisions also have an individual component, this study aims to augment both 
fields, building upon theoretical models of costly reputation while suggesting practical 
institutions that may be implemented to inhibit antisocial behavior. 
 
3 Theory 
This experiment is primarily interested in questions of if, and to what extent, publicity affects 
contribution levels. In addition, we are also interested in testing recent evidence of second-order 
punishment found in Cinyabuguma et al. (2004) and Masclet et al. (2005). The recent research 
lends itself to two testable hypotheses: 
 
Experimental Hypothesis 1. Publicly disclosing contribution decisions will reduce free-riding 
behavior, as participants will seek to avoid appearing antisocial. Marginal free riders will have an 
incentive to conform, even if they lack the motivation to reciprocate pro-social behavior. 
 
Experimental Hypothesis 2. Publicly disclosing the source of punishment will reduce punishing 
behavior. This may, in turn, reduce the threat of punishment and lead to lower levels of 
contributions. Average aggregate and within-individual punishment severity and frequency in 
treatments with public punishment will be lower than those in treatments with anonymous 
punishment, where there is no risk of counterpunishment. 
 
The basic theoretical model that the literature has developed suggests that the observed degree of 
social cooperation is co-determined by the (unobserved) characteristics and (observed) actions of 
both the individual and her group members. That is, 
 
 Social Cooperation = f( Individual and Group member characteristics,  
Individual and Group member actions, 
Institutions ) 
  
 Contribution Level = f( Lagged values of previous contribution levels, 
Lagged values of contributions relative to known mean, 
Lagged values of contributions relative to group members, 
Lagged values of punishment sent/received, 
Indicator for lagged increases in contributions, 
Indicator for highest/lowest known contribution, 
Indicator for last round of a game, 
Indicators for treatments ) 
 
Among these, this study is particularly interested in determining coefficient estimates for the 
treatment indicator variables in an effort to isolate the effect of different institutional 
environments on the observed level of social cooperation. Furthermore, due to the weak 
theoretical framework surrounding the connection between contribution decisions and other 
salient factors, we make the assumption that players will respond to changes in their environment 
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in an attempt to maximize their personal earnings. Specifically, we assume that contribution 
behavior will change in response to changes in individual characteristics (such as frustration, 
boredom, or amusement), group member actions (such as changes in group membership, or 
changes in contribution/punishment levels), and changes in the institutions. As a result, we have 
included several lagged variables to account for the factors that seem most relevant and are both 
available and salient to the individual player. Furthermore, it seems reasonable to attempt to 
proxy a player’s strategic and emotional state by including information about what has occurred 
most recently in the game. However, it is necessary to keep in mind that each discrete game is 
played in a series, and that it may not be strictly feasible to separate a player’s most recent 
contribution decisions from events that occurred in a different game, possibly much earlier in the 
series. The next section provides a more comprehensive discussion of this and other 
methodological considerations. 
 
4 Methodology 
Over the course of three weeks in April, 2009, 36 participants played a series of modified public 
goods games under various treatments of publicity and anonymity. Over the six hour-long 
sessions, each of the six participants present was matched with two other, randomly assigned 
players for six five-round games. After each game, the matchings were randomly rotated so that 
each player was with two other, randomly assigned players. The institutional characteristics were 
altered for each of the six games, and the order of these games was rotated to isolate sequence 
effects (none were found). The players took part in the experiment at computer terminals, using 
online software developed by Charles Holt at the University of Virginia, Veconlab. Due to the 
limitations of this software, the six games were divided into three sets of two, and a condition of 
anonymous punishment (as explained below) was not permitted in the second, fourth, or sixth 
treatments. After completing the six games (30 rounds) of the session, each player was asked to 
fill out a demographic questionnaire.  
The 36 participants were collected in a non-random, convenient sample through an email 
distributed en masse to students in several departments at Macalester College, in St. Paul, 
Minnesota. Participants were not rewarded at the time of the experimental session, but rather by 
participating gained one entry into a raffle for cash prizes. At the beginning of each session, 
participants were informed that the player with the most (hypothetical) earnings would receive 
an extra entry into the prize raffle. Because no earnings were paid at the end of the experimental 
sessions, it is possible that players were not strongly incentivized to maximize their earnings and 
hence did not behave as they would have given the opportunity to win money on the spot. 
The six games that were played during each experimental session were associated with six 
different experimental treatments. In all games, players were endowed with 25 tokens at the 
beginning of each round and could allocate these tokens between a private pool and a public one. 
Each token allocated to the private pool was worth $0.10 to the individual, and each token 
contributed to the public pool was worth $0.05 to the individual and $0.05 to each of her group 
members. Three of the games were played with public contributions, in which the experimenter 
announced every player’s level of contribution at the end of each round, from highest to lowest; 
the other three games were played with anonymous contributions. Within each of these 
contribution conditions, participants played games with no punishment, anonymous punishment, 
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or public punishment. Games with no punishment involved only contribution rounds, without the 
opportunity to purchase costly punishments, and revealed only the aggregated sum of the other 
group members’ contributions. Games with anonymous punishments allowed players to purchase 
costly punishments, and revealed the disaggregated contribution levels of the other two group 
members (next to an anonymized ID number). Also, players did not see the ID number of the 
player that punished them, if they happened to receive punishment in a given round. During 
these treatments, players could not tell with certainty who the other members of their group 
were, and had no way of determining the source of any punishment received. For all games that 
allowed punishment, up to ten punishment points could be purchased per round for $0.20 each 
that would reduce the round earnings of the target individual by 10 percent per point. Finally, 
during games with public punishment, players were given a list of six ID numbers next to the 
names of the other players in the room; the software also revealed the ID number of the player 
that punished them, should they happen to receive punishment in a given round. In these games 
players could, with certainty, identify the other members of their group as well as the source of 
any punishment received. The different characteristics of these treatments are summarized in the 
table below (where GM stands for group member): 
 
Contributions Punishments Know who GMs are 
Know 
contributions 
of GMs 
Know 
contributions 
of non-GMs 
Know 
source of 
punishment 
None No No No N/A 
Anonymous No Yes No No Anonymous 
Public Yes Yes No Yes 
None Maybe Maybe Yes N/A 
Anonymous Maybe Yes Yes No Public 
Public Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
Furthermore, in the next table below, each of the six treatments is designated by a two-letter code 
and shown in relation to relevant empirical literature that has focused on experiments with 
similar institutional conditions. For instance, there is some overlap in the upper-left hand 
treatment, AN, where both early public goods experiments and recent charity experiments have 
paid some attention. However, while charity experiments have focused on exploring the vertical 
axis, public goods literature has primarily focused on the sanction institution along the horizontal 
axis: 
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 No Punishment Anonymous Punishment Public Punishment 
Anonymous 
Contributions 
AN 
 
Earliest PG experiments 
Recent charity experiments 
AA 
 
Fehr & Gachter (2000) 
 
AP 
 
Cinyabuguma et al. (2004) 
Masclet et al. (2005) 
Public 
Contributions 
PN 
 
Adreoni & Petrie (2004) 
Alpizar et al. (2008) 
PA 
 
??? 
 
PP 
 
??? 
 
 
 
There are several obvious problems with this methodology. First, group familiarity is difficult to 
control. That is, by coincidence and for the sake of convenience, not all sessions included six 
complete strangers. As a result, it may be the case that participants are less willing (or more 
willing) to punish their friends or acquaintances than average. Based on the feedback received on 
the demographic questionnaire and during the debriefing period, it seems that familiar players 
were typically less willing to punish, and that treatments with the highest level of aggregate 
familiarity seemed to exhibit the lowest overall levels of punishment. Since this factor seems to 
have a marked effect of players’ willingness to punish, future studies should attempt to control 
this variable. Furthermore, it may be interesting to vary levels of familiarity within the 
laboratory, allowing players to introduce themselves to either specific other participants or to the 
group as a whole and observing any changes in behavior that may result. Likewise, if it is 
announced that the experimental session is one in a series of ongoing sessions or that the 
participants will be required to interact afterward, players may be less likely to act in an 
antisocial manner.  
Another obvious problem with this experimental procedure is the inability to completely control 
levels of publicity. For instance, in games with publicly announced contributions, allowing 
anonymous punishments may not be strictly feasible. Likewise, because each player is given a 
list of ID numbers and names in those games with public punishments, anonymous contributions 
are not strictly anonymous in the sense that each group member will see what her other two 
group members have contributed (instead of just an aggregate amount). This is due to limitations 
in the software used and should be feasible to correct in future studies.  
 
5 Results 
5.1 Overview 
Even the most highly aggregated form of the data, the grand means of the various treatments, 
shows an apparent relationship between institutional characteristics and contribution levels. 
These grand means are plotted on a single dimension below and represent the average amount 
contributed during a single round of the indicated game. These points seem to cluster in three 
areas: the lowest grand mean, for games with anonymous contributions and no punishment, is at 
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the low end of the spectrum (6.4 tokens contributed on average); games with public contributions 
and no punishment as well as games with anonymous contributions and anonymous punishment 
cluster between 7.5 and 8 tokens contributed on average; the remaining three games cluster 
between 9 and 10 tokens contributed.  
This preliminary analysis exhibits two interesting results. First, it is important to note that both 
publicizing contributions and allowing punishment seem to have a similar effect on contribution 
levels. Second, games that combine punishment with some form of publicity (either of 
contributions or of punishment) are associated with much higher levels of contribution. This 
latter result is especially apparent when comparing the grand means of AA and PA, where 
publicizing contributions (while allowing punishment) results in a marked increase over just 
allowing punishments.  
 
 
Figure 1. Grand Means of Contribution Levels for Indicated Treatments 
 
 
5.2 Aggregate Analysis 
If we disaggregate the data to allow for variation in contribution levels over the course of each 
game, this analysis becomes more nuanced. In the three figures below, the average contribution 
levels (from six sessions) are plotted over the five rounds of the indicated games. 
 
 
 
Figures 2 – 4. Average 
Contribution Levels for 
Indicated Treatments 
(grouped by punishment 
condition) 
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These graphs show that, especially in games with no punishment or anonymous punishment, 
publicizing contribution levels encourages players to contribute at a higher level, on average. 
However, under conditions of public punishment, there may be only limited benefits to 
publicizing contributions as well. Since the players are given a list of ID numbers and names at 
the beginning of those games with public punishment, this may be evidence that knowing the 
contribution levels of their non-group members does not drastically alter contribution decisions.  
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The graphs above present the same data, group by contribution condition. From these graphs it is 
also clear that games with public contributions (figure 6) tend to have higher levels of 
contribution than games with anonymous contribution (figure 5). However, it is still surprising to 
find that among games with anonymous contributions publicizing punishment leads to increased 
levels of contribution. Previous theory had suggested that because treatments with public 
punishments (solid, black lines) allow for counterpunishment, punishing activity should decrease 
under these conditions, and hence punishment itself would not prove to be a viable threat against 
antisocial behavior. Since publicizing punishment results in higher contribution levels in games 
with anonymous contributions and since there is no clear difference between anonymous and 
public punishment in games with public contributions, allowing for the possibility of 
counterpunishment does not seem to reduce contribution levels (though it may reduce 
punishment levels), as theory would suggest.  
In the three figures below, average punishment severity levels are plotted over the five rounds of 
the indicated game. In general, the variance of punishment is much smaller and, except for the 
final round of the PA treatment in figure 8 below, average punishment levels typically fluctuate 
between one and two points issued. Notably, in figure 7 the average level of punishment issued is 
lower for games with public punishment than for games with anonymous punishment, until the 
final round. This may indicate that players are punishing less than usual when there is the 
Figures 5 – 6. Average 
Contribution Levels for 
Indicated Treatments 
(grouped by contribution 
condition)  
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possibility of counterpunishment (i.e. in games with public punishment). This interpretation is 
reinforced by the fact that the punishment increases during the final round, when there is no risk 
of retribution. 
 
 
 
 
After the experiment was completed, participants were asked to fill out a brief demographic 
survey with questions regarding their gender, age, year in school, major(s)/minor(s), athleticism, 
and country/urbanicity of origin. While the sample is not representative of any population, it is 
still interesting to note several surprising relationships between the demographic information and 
contribution/punishment decisions. For instance, while there was no discernable difference 
between male and female contribution levels, males tended to punish significantly more than 
females. Students that participated in a team sport tended to contribute less and punish less than 
others. Furthermore, all of the following groups tended to contribute significantly less and punish 
significantly more than average: urban/suburban students, students of international origin, 
students majoring in math, science, or economics, and underclassmen or younger students.  
Perhaps as a result of these characteristics, the players that earned the most (hypothetical) money 
were female in 5 out of the 6 sessions, and (rural or suburban) Midwesterners in 4 out of the 6 
Figures 7 – 8.  Average 
Punishment Levels for 
Indicated Treatments 
(grouped by contribution 
condition)  
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sessions. Analyzing the winning strategy reveals that, overall, winners contributed more than 
non-winners, especially in games with anonymous punishment (AA, PA; 2.2 tokens higher) and 
games with public punishment (AP, PP; 2.7 tokens higher). Winners also tended to punish less 
than non-winners (0.4 points less, on average).  
 
5.3 Regression Analysis 
A comprehensive multivariate regression analysis was also performed on the 1,080 panel data 
observations collected over the course of the experiment (N = 36, T = 30), as well as several 
subsets of the data. The primary purpose of this regression analysis was to determine if, and to 
what extent, the institutional variables had an effect on contribution and punishment levels over 
the course of each experimental session. A Wooldridge (2002) test for autocorrelation in the 
panel data identified the existence of first-order autocorrelation. A Hausman test indicated that 
fixed effects were a consistent estimator of the unobserved heterogeneity in the data, and a vector 
autoregressive estimation technique was simulated by using lagged values of the dependent and 
independent variables (due the lack of support for panel VAR analysis in Stata 10.0). In all cases, 
autocorrelation was computed using the autocorrelation of the residuals with a two-step 
estimating process. Although the variables included in these regressions correctly predicted only 
about half of the between-subject variance and about 20 percent of the within-subject variance, 
the analysis indicated that the institutional variables were all positive and significantly different 
from the baseline (AN; anonymous contributions with no punishments). This preliminary result 
suggests that both punishment and publicity independently increase players’ contribution levels.  
Table 1 shows the results of three panel regressions with autoregressive disturbances (T-statistics 
greater than 1.50 (p < 0.13) are marked in bold). Model 1 provides a baseline, with just one 
autoregressive term. Model 2 includes additional lagged values of the dependent variable. Model 
3 condenses the 6 treatment indicators (AN, AA, AP, PN, PA, PP) into 6 institutional indicators 
to examine the effect of institutional characteristics that may be shared across several treatments. 
These condensed indicator variables comprise: whether contributions were public, whether 
punishment was allowed, and whether punishment was public (still using AN as a baseline). 
Other variables in models 1 – 3 and subsequent models include:  
 
• Contribution Level Increased (an indicator that equals 1 if the player increased their 
contribution level in the specified round);  
• Amount Contributed below GM [Group Member] Average (calculated by averaging the total 
contributions from all group members for the specified round, then subtracting this from the 
player’s contribution);  
• Difference from GM 1 (or 2) Contribution (calculated by subtracting the specified group 
member’s contribution from the player’s contribution for the specified round);  
• Made Highest (or Lowest) Known Contribution (an indicator that equals 1 if the player made 
the highest (or lowest) contribution based on either the two other group members’ 
contributions or the publicly disclosed contributions of all six participants);  
• Amount of Punishment Sent/Received (the number of punishment points the player 
sent/received during the specified round);  
• Last Round Indicator (an indicator that equals 1 if the decision occurs during the last (fifth) 
round of a game); and  
• Indicator variables for the various treatments (6 indicators) or the institutional conditions that 
define the treatments (3 indicators). 
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Variable Name
Number of Lagged Values
Contribution Level (autoregressive)
One round before ------ ------ ------
Two rounds before 0.125 1.73 0.125 1.76
Three rounds before 0.101 2.56 0.100 2.51
Four rounds before -0.042 -1.27 -0.045 -1.36
Five rounds before 0.019 0.59 0.015 0.48
Contribution Level Increased
One round before 1.34 3.44 1.32 3.33 1.36 3.43
Two rounds before 0.498 1.44 0.681 1.63 0.692 1.65
Amount Contributed below GM Average
One round before 0.379 5.37 0.442 5.95 0.438 5.9
Two rounds before 0.102 1.50 -0.073 -0.77 -0.070 -0.75
Difference from GM 1 Contribution
One round before -0.095 -2.67 -0.103 -2.79 -0.098 -2.67
Two rounds before -0.037 -1.15 0.039 0.88 0.041 0.94
Difference from GM 2 Contribution
One round before -0.122 -3.54 -0.144 -4.1 -0.148 -4.21
Two rounds before -0.053 -1.72 0.027 0.59 0.023 0.5
Made Highest Known Contribution
One round before -0.500 -1.15 -0.665 -1.51 -0.690 -1.57
Made Lowest Known Contribution
One round before 0.860 1.97 0.815 1.86 0.793 1.81
Amount of Punishment Sent
One round before 0.008 0.10 -0.017 -0.21 -0.027 -0.34
Two rounds before 0.127 1.60 0.080 1.01 0.073 0.93
Three rounds before -0.136 -1.74 -0.163 -2.08 -0.166 -2.13
Amount of Punishment Received
One round before -0.025 -0.38 -0.025 -0.38 -0.033 -0.5
Two rounds before 0.083 1.23 0.069 1.04 0.063 0.95
Three rounds before 0.017 0.26 0.027 0.4 0.024 0.37
Four rounds before -0.093 -1.38 -0.112 -1.68 -0.112 -1.68
Last Round Indicator -1.10 -3.11 -1.14 -3.27 -1.19 -3.4
Treatment Indicators
Anon. Contrib., Anon. Punishment 2.98 4.80 3.19 5.02
Anon. Contrib., Public Punishment 4.19 6.81 4.17 6.48
Public Contrib., No Punishment 1.82 2.31 1.99 2.47
Public Contrib., Anon. Punishment 4.64 7.06 4.52 6.71
Public Contrib., Public Punishment 4.83 7.46 4.74 6.98
Contributions Public 1.11 2.97
Punishment Allowed 2.83 6.42
Punishment Public 0.64 1.82
Constant Term 4.25 7.1 2.74 3.33 3.30 4.57
Number of Usable Observations 900 864 864
Within-R
2
0.2054 0.2231 0.2209
Between-R
2
0.4882 0.8253 0.8176
Fraction of Variance due to µi 0.4573 0.3873 0.3910
F-statistic 14.70 3.86 4.02
AR(1-5) & Condensed 
Institutional Variables
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Table 1. Regression Coefficients and T-statistics for Models 1 – 3
Baseline
With Autoregressive 
Disturbances (1-5)
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These models assume that players’ contribution decisions are based on both the immediately 
salient information (what happened in the previous round) and a longer-term trend (what 
happened earlier in the game). As a result, multiple lagged values are used to approximate 
players’ recent decisions and observations. While the number of lagged values used is largely 
arbitrary (meaning that there is no prior theory regarding the proper number of lags), typically at 
least one lagged value within the five most recent rounds proved to have a significant effect on 
contribution levels. No lags from more than five rounds before were included because the 
matchings and institutions changed every five rounds. 
With only a single autoregressive disturbance, Model 1 provides a relatively high F-statistic and 
comparable within-subject R2. This suggests that adding higher order autoregressive lags does 
not markedly alter the power of the model to predict changes in behavior within individuals. Nor 
does their inclusion dramatically change the values of the coefficients on other variables, with 
the possible exception of those variables that compare the individual’s contribution to the other 
group members’. The largest coefficient in Model 1 is a trend indicator that equals 1 if the 
contribution level increased in the specific round. This coefficient suggests that players’ 
contribution decisions are partly determined by the recent trend in their contributions; if they 
recently increased their contribution level, they are likely to contribute 1.34 more tokens than if 
they did not recently increase their contributions. The coefficient on this trend indicator 
fluctuates between 1.2 and 1.9 tokens in different specifications. 
The next five variables in the model place the individual player’s decision in the context of the 
larger group and demonstrate the existence of conformity. That is, in a group setting there is 
some regression toward the mean in which players that contribute more than average reduce their 
contributions and those that contribute less than average increase them. Specifically, the positive 
coefficient on the amount contributed below the group mean suggests that for every 2 to 2.5 
tokens that a player contributes below the group mean in the previous round (as determined by 
her own contributions and those of her two group members), the player is likely to increase her 
contributions by one token, on average.  
Likewise, the negative coefficients on the differences between the player’s contribution and the 
contribution of each of her group members (which may be more salient in certain treatments than 
the group mean) suggests that if a group member contributes less than the player, the player will 
reduce her contribution level (by about a token for every 8-10 tokens of difference). Finally the 
indicators for the highest/lowest contribution made indicate that if the player believes she has 
made the highest known contribution (either among her 2 other group members or among those 
in the room, depending on the treatment) she is likely to decrease her contribution; likewise if the 
player believes she has made the lowest known contribution she is likely to increase her 
contribution. However, while both of these effects are significant, they are small in magnitude 
(typically less than 1 or 2 tokens). 
Surprisingly, punishment received does not seem to be a significant predictor of contribution 
behavior, suggesting that players may not increase contributions in direct response to receiving 
punishment. However, the treatment indicators suggest that the punishment institution does 
result in higher contributions, as all treatment coefficients are positive and significantly different 
from the baseline (AN). As we saw in the graph of grand means by treatment, AA and PN are 
clustered together (2 to 3 tokens higher) and AP, PA and PP are clustered (4 to 5 tokens higher). 
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Variable Name
Number of Lagged Values
Contribution Level (autoregressive)
One round before ------ ------ ------
Two rounds before 0.027 0.32 0.045 0.54 0.021 0.25
Three rounds before 0.121 2.86 0.122 2.87 0.118 2.79
Four rounds before -0.058 -1.63 -0.054 -1.52 -0.060 -1.69
Five rounds before 0.043 1.28 0.042 1.24 0.042 1.23
Contribution Level Increased
One round before 1.41 3.34 1.39 3.27 1.41 3.35
Two rounds before 0.946 2.13 0.968 2.17 0.954 2.15
Amount Contributed below GM Average
One round before 0.331 4.27 0.323 4.15 0.334 4.31
Two rounds before 0.045 0.44 0.032 0.32 0.052 0.51
Difference from GM 1 Contribution
One round before -0.041 -1.04 -0.029 -0.74 -0.040 -1.01
Two rounds before 0.009 0.18 0.027 0.56 0.008 0.15
Difference from GM 2 Contribution
One round before -0.098 -2.68 -0.110 -3.01 -0.105 -2.86
Two rounds before -0.033 -0.65 -0.032 -0.64 -0.037 -0.74
Made Highest Known Contribution
One round before -0.689 -1.45 -1.05 -2.30 -0.686 -1.45
Made Lowest Known Contribution
One round before 0.896 1.95 0.586 1.32 0.961 2.08
Amount of Punishment Sent
One round before 0.019 0.23 -0.008 -0.09 0.015 0.18
Two rounds before 0.135 1.62 0.125 1.50 0.130 1.56
Three rounds before -0.119 -1.40 -0.131 -1.54 -0.119 -1.40
Amount of Punishment Received
One round before -0.048 -0.74 -0.059 -0.90 -0.052 -0.81
Two rounds before 0.090 1.30 0.086 1.24 0.086 1.24
Three rounds before -0.020 -0.27 -0.023 -0.32 -0.020 -0.28
Four rounds before -0.196 -2.54 -0.195 -2.52 -0.192 -2.50
Last Round Indicator -1.09 -2.80 -1.10 -2.81 -1.11 -2.83
Treatment Indicators
Contributions Public 1.06 2.68 1.08 2.76
Punishment Public 0.558 1.61 0.602 1.75
Constant Term 6.79 8.61 7.19 9.30 6.59 8.31
Number of Usable Observations 684 684 684
Within-R
2
0.1473 0.1402 0.1522
Between-R
2
0.6706 0.8176 0.6472
Fraction of Variance due to µi 0.5159 0.5061 0.5207
F-statistic 4.99 4.82 5.09
Table 2. Regression Coefficients and T-statistics for Models 4 – 6
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Model 3, for Games 
with Punishment
Model 3, for Games 
with Punishment
Model 3, for Games 
with Punishment
 
 
Table 2 shows the results from three regressions using data only from those games that allowed 
punishment (AA, AP, PA, PP). The institutional indicators are varied across Models 4 – 6 to 
demonstrate the robustness of these point estimates both when used independently and together. 
The original coefficient estimates obtained from Model 3 indicate that publicizing contributions 
results in contribution levels that are higher on average by about 1.11 tokens; this result is 
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confirmed for the subset of the data with punishment in Models 4 – 6. Likewise, Model 3 
indicates that publicizing punishment has a much smaller effect on contribution levels (resulting 
in an increase of about 0.64 tokens on average. Models 4 – 6 confirm that this point estimate was 
not biased by observations from the subset of data where punishment was not allowed (and 
hence public punishment was not possible). Furthermore, the fact that these point estimates are 
consistent when modeled separately and together suggests that they independently affect 
contribution levels; indeed, including them both in the model (as in Model 6) marginally 
increases the significance of each variable. 
Table 3, below, shows the results of regressions using data from either games with public 
contributions (Models 7 and 8) or anonymous contributions (Model 9). These results indicate 
that the model predicts changes in behavior within individuals better in games with anonymous 
punishment, though it is worse at accounting for the variation between individuals. Likewise, in 
games with public contributions (as in Models 7 and 8), recent contribution decisions (both in 
terms of autoregressive lags and the trend indicator) prove to be larger and more significant 
predictors of contribution levels, possibly because players may act more erratically when their 
contributions are not publicized every round.  
Similarly, the coefficients and t-statistics on the variables that indicate whether the player made 
the highest/lowest known contribution are much lower and less significant in games with 
anonymous punishment. This suggests that even if players are aware of the contributions of their 
two other group members, they may not react as strongly to knowing that they contributed the 
most (or least) as they would have if their contributions were made public to those in the room. 
This indicates that conformity plays an observable role in treatments with public contributions, 
and that players are more likely to conform when the group is larger or when more people know 
about their contribution decisions.  
Games with public contributions also seem to have larger last round effects, while players in 
games with anonymous contributions respond more significantly to punishment received in the 
previous round. Both of these results imply that allowing punishment and publicizing 
contributions may in effect act as substitutes, since the threat of punishment is taken more 
seriously when players are more likely to act in an antisocial manner (in games with anonymous 
contributions). Whereas when players already face incentives to act pro-socially, they may not 
respond to punishment as much, since the threat of a monetary loss may not sufficiently deter 
antisocial behavior given the reality of a reputational loss. 
This interpretation is reinforced by the change in the coefficient on the variable that indicates 
whether punishment is allowed. That is, allowing punishment has a smaller, less significant 
effect on contributions in games with public contributions, compared to games with anonymous 
ones. Specifically, this coefficient more than doubles from 1.68 (in games with public 
contributions) to 3.89 (in games with anonymous contributions), reinforcing the notion of 
publicity and punishment as substitutes. Model 8 also demonstrates that publicizing punishment 
has a much smaller, insignificant effect on contribution levels when contributions are already 
public. This result may indicate diminishing returns to publicity: although games with public 
contributions and public punishment have the highest level of average aggregate contributions, 
there may be only marginal increases in publicity when either contributions or punishment is 
already public. 
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Variable Name
Number of Lagged Values
Contribution Level (autoregressive)
One round before ------ ------ ------
Two rounds before 0.282 2.34 0.328 2.76 0.116 1.21
Three rounds before 0.110 1.72 0.102 1.60 0.063 1.15
Four rounds before -0.014 -0.26 -0.015 -0.28 -0.099 -2.20
Five rounds before -0.011 -0.22 -0.019 -0.36 0.025 0.56
Contribution Level Increased
One round before 1.54 2.39 1.59 2.46 1.18 2.18
Two rounds before 0.754 1.13 0.724 1.08 0.264 0.46
Amount Contributed below GM Average
One round before 0.433 3.40 0.417 3.26 0.453 4.12
Two rounds before -0.100 -0.65 -0.136 -0.89 -0.125 -0.96
Difference from GM 1 Contribution
One round before -0.081 -1.37 -0.065 -1.11 -0.109 -2.00
Two rounds before 0.073 0.99 0.097 1.33 0.074 1.20
Difference from GM 2 Contribution
One round before -0.149 -2.44 -0.147 -2.39 -0.104 -2.02
Two rounds before 0.130 1.72 0.148 1.94 0.029 0.49
Made Highest Known Contribution
One round before -2.56 -2.79 -2.59 -2.80 0.065 0.11
Made Lowest Known Contribution
One round before 1.16 1.39 1.13 1.36 0.310 0.54
Amount of Punishment Sent
One round before -0.023 -0.17 0.022 0.16 -0.162 -1.36
Two rounds before 0.036 0.25 0.076 0.55 0.133 1.22
Three rounds before -0.234 -1.76 -0.237 -1.77 -0.190 -1.72
Amount of Punishment Received
One round before 0.129 1.11 0.166 1.43 -0.198 -2.02
Two rounds before 0.193 1.67 0.217 1.87 0.040 0.43
Three rounds before -0.003 -0.03 -0.018 -0.16 0.060 0.60
Four rounds before 0.005 0.05 -0.023 -0.23 -0.302 -2.94
Last Round Indicator -1.33 -2.42 -1.44 -2.63 -1.09 -2.34
Treatment Indicators
Punishment Allowed 1.68 2.19 3.89 6.18
Punishment Public 0.317 0.57
Constant Term 4.04 3.38 4.94 4.38 4.11 3.98
Number of Usable Observations 420 420 408
Within-R
2
0.1653 0.1508 0.2605
Between-R
2
0.7217 0.6809 0.4902
Fraction of Variance due to µi 0.4075 0.4165 0.5111
F-statistic 1.83 1.75 3.11
Model 3, for Games 
with Public Contrib.
Model 3, for Games 
with Public Contrib.
Model 3, for Games 
with Anon. Contrib.
Table 3. Regression Coefficients and T-statistics for Models 7 – 9
Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
 
Table 4, below, provides regression results for the subset of the data with either public 
punishment (Model 10), anonymous punishment (Model 11) or anonymous or no punishment 
(Model 12). The results are largely consistent with those from previous models. Interestingly, the 
coefficient on the highest known contribution indicator is much larger in magnitude and more 
significant in games with anonymous punishments, compared to games with either public or no 
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punishments. Players in games with anonymous punishment may have a greater to incentive to 
conform (i.e. reduce contributions) if they fear being singled out by free riders for second-order 
punishment. While the literature suggests that public punishment may result in increased second-
order punishment, it is not necessarily the case that allowing anonymous punishment will 
increase pro-social behavior. This is especially true if players are afraid of “sticking out” when 
they can be punished without repercussions, as these results suggest. 
Furthermore, it is interesting that the coefficient on public contributions indicator is larger and 
more significant in treatments with anonymous punishment. As discussed before, due to the 
limitations of the Veconlab software, it was not strictly possible to keep contributions 
anonymous during games with public punishment, nor punishment anonymous during games 
with public contributions. As a result, it is difficult to identify what portion of this coefficient is 
due to the effect of intentionally publicizing contributions and what portion is due to the effect of 
unintentionally publicizing punishment (by revealing group membership). It is clear from Model 
10, however, that publicizing contributions has an insignificant effect in games where 
punishment is already public, just as in Model 8. 
No significant relationship could be found between institutional characteristics and punishment 
levels when using the amount of punishment sent as a dependent variable. This may be due to the 
relatively small sample size, and relatively costly and infrequent punishing activity. 
Finally, the residuals for these models were plotted against the dependent variable, over time, 
and between panels. No noticeable patterns could be identified, suggesting that any 
heteroskedasticity present in the raw data was minimized in the autocorrelative fixed-effects 
panel regressions shown above. Samples of these residual plots are in Appendix C, after 
Summary Statistics and an abbreviated Covariance Matrix, in Appendices A and B, respectively. 
Appendix D also contains a sample of the instructions provided to the participants.  
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Variable Name
Number of Lagged Values
Contribution Level (autoregressive)
One round before ------ ------ ------
Two rounds before 0.155 1.21 0.307 3.04 0.187 1.35
Three rounds before 0.055 0.87 0.052 0.92 0.109 1.69
Four rounds before -0.054 -1.04 -0.072 -1.53 -0.029 -0.54
Five rounds before 0.094 1.86 -0.075 -1.57 0.029 0.52
Contribution Level Increased
One round before 1.88 2.96 1.65 2.96 1.25 1.92
Two rounds before 0.235 0.35 0.845 1.43 0.636 0.93
Amount Contributed below GM Average
One round before 0.292 2.36 0.341 3.13 0.216 1.77
Two rounds before -0.180 -1.17 -0.170 -1.28 0.067 0.41
Difference from GM 1 Contribution
One round before -0.017 -0.26 -0.074 -1.48 -0.029 -0.49
Two rounds before 0.078 0.97 0.115 1.97 0.056 0.76
Difference from GM 2 Contribution
One round before -0.072 -1.25 -0.116 -2.17 -0.016 -0.27
Two rounds before -0.022 -0.30 0.172 2.53 0.077 0.89
Made Highest Known Contribution
One round before -0.430 -0.59 -1.08 -1.76 -0.530 -0.74
Made Lowest Known Contribution
One round before 1.03 1.40 0.491 0.62 0.364 0.53
Amount of Punishment Sent
One round before 0.013 0.11 0.224 1.79 0.105 0.77
Two rounds before 0.099 0.82 0.120 0.99 0.223 1.60
Three rounds before -0.012 -0.10 -0.236 -2.12 -0.242 -1.81
Amount of Punishment Received
One round before 0.045 0.42 -0.067 -0.68 -0.205 -2.04
Two rounds before 0.237 2.30 -0.078 -0.79 -0.069 -0.62
Three rounds before -0.017 -0.16 -0.071 -0.75 -0.158 -1.32
Four rounds before -0.289 -2.55 -0.066 -0.69 -0.096 -0.75
Last Round Indicator -1.14 -1.97 -1.02 -2.17 -1.06 -1.81
Treatment Indicator
Contributions Public 0.567 1.05 1.21 2.11 0.902 1.43
Constant Term 5.97 4.73 5.05 5.29 6.04 5.02
Number of Usable Observations 324 504 342
Within-R
2
0.1767 0.1902 0.1948
Between-R
2
0.7744 0.4889 0.7398
Fraction of Variance due to µi 0.5585 0.4317 0.4868
F-statistic 3.48 2.46 2.79
Model 12
Model 3, for Games 
w/ Pub. Punishments
Model 3, for Games 
w/ Anon. Punishments
Model 3, for Games 
w/ Anon. or No Pun.
Model 10 Model 11
Table 4. Regression Coefficients and T-statistics for Models 10 – 12
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6 Conclusions 
This experiment aimed to unite two discrete streams of academic inquiry by examining the effect 
of publicity on social cooperation in a public good game. Previous literature had speculated that 
this type of publicity would increase pro-social behavior because marginal non-cooperators 
would have an incentive to prevent a costly loss of reputation by avoiding full free-ridership. 
However, recent empirical evidence also suggests that publicity may be counterproductive if the 
welfare losses from counterpunishment offset the welfare gains from punishment.  
With this is mind, the experiment described above used a simple 2 x 3 experimental design to 
examine changes in aggregate and within-individual behavior under institutions of anonymous or 
public contributions, as well as anonymous, public or no punishment. Two experimental 
hypotheses were explored, including the hypothesis that free-ridership would decrease under 
conditions of public contributions and that public punishment would be suboptimal because it 
would allow for the possibility of second-order punishment found in Cinyabuguma et al. (2004) 
and Masclet et al. (2005). This study finds strong evidence in support of the first experimental 
hypothesis, but further research is necessary to clarify ambiguous results with respect to the 
second. 
The fact that participants tended to contribute slightly more when their actions were made public 
reinforces theoretical models of costly reputation and implies that public disclosure may serve as 
a viable substitute to the sanction institution. However, the results also suggest that there may be 
diminishing returns to publicity, and that the pro-social effect of publicizing contributions may 
instead have resulted from increased awareness of group norms and normal levels of 
contribution. Future studies should aim to exercise better experimental control over how 
contributions and punishments are publicized in an effort to distinguish the effect of conformity 
from the effect of changing institutional characteristics. Likewise, future research should focus 
on controlling familiarity, and identifying to what extent group familiarity plays a role in group 
decision-making. Likewise, the public good game may be modified to investigate other, 
theoretically relevant factors, such as reciprocity.  
Surprisingly, neither lagged values of the amount of punishment sent nor received seemed to 
have a significant effect on current contribution decisions. Nevertheless, those games that 
allowed some form of punishment had significantly higher levels of aggregate contribution. As a 
result, it seems likely that it is the threat of receiving punishment rather than the actual receipt 
that motivates the decrease in free-riding behavior. As such, the variation in contribution 
behavior between those treatments that allowed punishment may be due to the participants’ 
perception of the credibility of the threat of punishment. Future studies should consider exploring 
this factor as well. For instance, making punishment strictly credible (where the lowest 
contributor(s) always receives some punishment) or more costly (and hence less credible) may 
affect how much weight players place on the possibility of receiving punishment when making 
contribution decisions. 
Given the recent collapse of the financial sector and calls for increased regulation, it is important 
to consider that transparency and the public disclosure of actions may serve as a viable substitute 
or complement to the traditional, centralized monitoring mechanism by also allowing 
decentralized monitoring to exact a costly loss of reputation on firms with antisocial behavior. 
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Appendix B: Covariance Matrix 
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Appendix C: Residual Plots 
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Figure 9. Residual Plot for Model 3 over time Figure 10. Residual Plot across panels (PID)  
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Figure 11. Residual Plot over contribution level Figure 12. Residual Plot over lagged contribution level 
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Appendix D: Sample of Experimental Instructions 
As part of today's experiment, you will play 6 short games on the computer. In these games there 
are no right and wrong answers, so you can choose to play however you want. 
 
 
The 6 short games you will play today must be accessed online at: 
http://veconlab.econ.virginia.edu/login1.php 
 
 
OVERVIEW 
• In each game there will be 5 rounds.  
• You will be in a group of 3, and you will be with the same 3 people for the whole game 
(5 rounds). 
 
TOKENS 
• At the beginning of each round you will receive 25 tokens. 
• You may decide how many tokens to keep for yourself and how many to contribute to the 
public pool. 
• Each token you keep for yourself will be worth $0.10 to you. 
• Each token you contribute will be worth $0.05 to each and every person in your group. 
• Your earnings will be calculated as: E = 0.10(Num. of tokens you keep) + 0.05(Num. 
tokens you contribute) + 0.05(Num. tokens that others contribute) 
• The person who wins the most (hypothetical) money today will gain one extra entry into 
the prize raffle. 
 
PUNISHMENT 
• In some games you will be able to punish the other members of your group. 
• You can punish any player, including those that contribute less than you, those that 
contribute the same amount as you, and those that contribute more than you. 
• Punishment will occur during the second stage of each round, after everyone has chosen 
their contributions. 
• You may purchase up to 10 punishment points in each round, at a cost of $0.20 for each 
point. 
• A punishment point will lower the earnings of the person you punish by 10% for each 
point.  
• For example, if you buy 3 punishment points, and the person you punish would have 
earned $2, they will instead earn $1.40 (70% of $2) 
• In other words, calculating your earnings based on the contribution stage results in 
earnings of E, and your final earnings after the punishment stage will be: Final Earnings 
= Earnings - 0.10*Punishment points*Earnings 
 
 
After all games are completed, I will email out a brief demographic survey with questions 
regarding your age, gender, major(s) and minor(s) and country/urbanicity of origin. There will be 
a short debriefing period with time provided to ask questions. 
   
 
